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Abstract:  
Examining the process by which religious and political groups undergo radicalization 
to a point where they eventually espouse the instrumentality of violence and terrorism for 
achieving their political objectives is a prevalent issue in the post-post-9/11 world, or in an era 
that might come to be known as the “9/11-century.” This topic is timely and relevant in the 
context of religion and politics in the current geopolitical world given that we consistently see 
cyclical patterns of violent (Islamic) extremism, especially during times of crises, and in 
which members of entire demographic spectrums have become involved. This paper presents 
an examination of the religious radicalization of the highly ritualistic and extremely 
conservative Muslim group Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah) or “The Islamic 
Resistance Movement” and former armed revolution group in Egypt during the 1970s and 
much of the 1990s Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya (GAI). In doing so, it connects with the subjects 
of radicalization and deradicalization of such groups analyzing why some extremist groups 
eventually undergo a process of deradicalization while others do not. As one perspective 
commonly held among experts on terrorism and political violence underscores, terrorism is 
ultimately the product of parallel radicalization, and focuses on three groups; those of: 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders (Baumeister, 1997; Miller, 1999; Staub, 1989). Thus, 
terrorism or asymmetric conflict and forms of political violence may be seen as the product of 
the interaction of multiple agents that consider their actions correct, a legitimate method of 
expressing discontent, and is consequently conducive to a vicious cycle of violence, 
aggression, and insecurity. 
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Introduction: 
Examining the process by which religious and political groups undergo radicalization 
to a point where they eventually espouse the instrumentality of violence and terrorism for 
achieving their political objectives is a prevalent issue in the post-post-9/11 world, or in an era 
that might come to be known as the “9/11-century.” This topic is timely and relevant in the 
context of religion and politics in the current geopolitical world given that we consistently see 
cyclical patterns of violent (Islamic) extremism, especially during times of crises, and in 
which members of entire demographic spectrums have become involved. This paper presents 
an examination of the religious radicalization of the highly ritualistic and extremely 
conservative Muslim group Hamas (Harakat Al-Muqawamah Al-Islamiyyah) or “The Islamic 
Resistance Movement” and former armed revolution group in Egypt during the 1970s and 
much of the 1990s Al-Gama’a Al’Islamiyya (GAI). In doing so, it connects with the subjects 
of radicalization and deradicalization of such groups analyzing why some extremist groups 
eventually undergo a process of deradicalization while others do not. As one perspective 
commonly held among experts on terrorism and political violence underscores, terrorism is 
ultimately the product of parallel radicalization, and focuses on three groups; those of: 
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders (Baumeister, 1997; Miller, 1999; Staub, 1989). Thus, 
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terrorism or asymmetric conflict and forms of political violence may be seen as the product of 
the interaction of multiple agents that consider their actions correct, a legitimate method of 
expressing discontent, and is consequently conducive to a vicious cycle of violence, 
aggression, and insecurity. 
 
Radicalization and Deradicalization as Concepts of Subjectivity: 
Specific indicators can be taken as means of observing a process of radicalization, 
which can often times transition into violent extremism. Although there is no absolute way of 
knowing that any one individual will become radicalized to the point where they will become 
the perpetrator of violent extremist acts, a great deal of experience suggests a number of 
indicators that are worth stating. It is also of value to note that while terrorist radicalization 
has been an ongoing issue in many parts of the world, new breeding ground for terrorism has 
surfaced, where it has not been traditionally observed. The US, UK, and parts of Western and 
Eastern Europe (i.e., Germany, France, Norway, the former-Yugoslavia, and Russia) have 
provided fertile breeding grounds for “homegrown” terrorism or terrorist acts that occur 
within the states that those terrorists target (Khawla, 2010). 
Terrorism, whether associated with an international organization (IO) or with an 
isolated individual or individuals that have not been radicalized as part of larger and 
compatible group, is the likely peak of a systematic process of radicalization (Khawa, 2010). 
This process, according to Silber and Bhatt (2007), is one through which “local residents or 
citizens gradually adopt an extremist religious/political ideology hostile to the West, which 
legitimizes terrorism as a tool to affect societal change,” and that is then advanced by a 
number of ideological and extremist influences (Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 16). Although this 
definition is not one that can be universally accepted, given that terrorist radicalization has 
taken place elsewhere in the world and by those seeking to engage in violent extremist acts 
against non-Western states and actors (not just those within the Western world), it should be 
taken in specific context as outlined by those defining it. The US has defined radicalization in 
terms of violent radicalization, referring to “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist 
belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, 
religious, or social change” (House Representative [HR] 1955, 2007; Silber and Bhatt, 2007: 
16).  
While government authorities in the US have formulated numerous definitions for 
radicalization, further definitions put forth by other government bodies and agents beyond the 
US serve as useful intellectualizing devices while also revealing that relatively limited 
attention has been afforded to understanding what the concept entails. The European 
Commission (EC) (2012) recognizes radicalization “as a complex phenomenon of people 
embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.” The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (2009) highlights the existence 
of gaps in the legal definition of critical terms such as “extremism” and “terrorism,” and 
shows that while “radicalism” might be understood as one’s support for opinions and methods 
of an extreme nature, it draws attention to the fact that the term itself and when applied 
remains problematic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has not put any 
definition forward regarding what is considered “radical,” nor has it properly engaged with 
any derivatives of the word, including “radicalism” or “radicalization” so as to provide 
definitions that can be either theorized or put into practice. Even the US Department of 
Defense (DoD), as of 2008, has not produced a working definition of any of the terms, nor 
can definitions for the concepts of “radicalization,” “radicalism,” or “radicalize” be found in 
the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (COED). Thus, a lack of consensus exists regarding 
the meaning of these terms, what they actually involve, and how they relate to a wider range 
of conditions within society. This area is still expanding, but not at the same rate as the issues 
with which the terms would assist in addressing.  
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In a chapter of a report by Neumann (2008), published through The International 
Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) entitled, “Perspectives 
on Radicalization and Political Violence,” radicalization is simply referred to as “what goes 
on before the bomb goes off” (4). Della Porta and LaFree (2012) define radicalization simply 
as “a process leading towards the increased use of political violence, while de-radicalization, 
by contrast, implies reduction in the use of political violence” (5). These definitions denote 
that a social and political aspect is involved, but focus on an expectation that violence is the 
ultimate goal. According to Della Porta (2012), much of the current research on radicalization 
has delved deeply into the idea of social movements and transitions as significant shares of 
the process (See, Della Porta, 1995; Tilly, 2004; Wood, 2003). In order to reflect the social 
currents that fuel the radicalization process and for the purpose of this study, radicalization is 
understood as a flexible process that includes the adoption of an extremist belief system 
shared by others, and the willingness to use or support the use of violence and the fear of 
violence in order to achieve the desired social or political changes in any given society. While 
this can take place with a group or on an individual basis, the process of radicalization does 
not have to result in the use of violence. 
Radicalization as a fluid process implies that a different meaning of the process is 
assumed differently either by those going through it or by those associated with it by other 
means. The fluidity of radicalization also holds that there is no specified timetable involved, 
and that violent extremist acts need not be the ultimate result of the entire process as noted. 
An individual may begin radicalizing, remain latent in any one of the four stages previously 
discussed, exit the process, or even re-enter the process of radicalization at any time (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation [FBI] Counterterrorism Division, 2006: 3-4).  
Internal and external factors are observed as the core expedients of initial 
radicalization. These can be factors that are unique to each individual but that may hold a 
common bond among them. Those becoming involved in the process are identified using a 
typology that considers distinct motivations and conversion types. The USG, while 
identifying would-be extremists as jilted believers, protest converts, acceptance seekers, and 
faith reinterpreters, contains all of them within a single lens that perceives them as having the 
potential to become involved in Jihadi violence (FBI, 2006: 3). Movement is made toward 
radicalization whereby an individual drifts from a previous life (i.e., social routines and 
customs or activities, and bonds or relationships) and associates with others sharing similar 
thoughts and convictions that can serve to maintain but often strengthen their collective 
dedication to their faith (i.e., Islam) (FBI, 2006: 3). An individual reaches a level of 
indoctrination when he or she has become influenced by and committed to a call for action in 
order to serve the cause to which the individual has become dedicated. This point represents a 
testing ground for both the organization or group and the individuals to assess the individual’s 
willingness to serve the cause and their resolve. Instances of action, which can be interpreted 
in multiple ways, including the direct participation in violent extremist acts (Jihad), support of 
the group’s operations that involve violent attack, recruitment and training of potential 
supporters, and financing are indicative of completing the entire radicalization process  (FBI, 
2006: 3). 
To address a the concept of deradicalization we can simply refer to this through the 
use of a wide array of facilitating word, including those of: “desertion,” “demobilization,” 
“defection,” “rehabilitation,” “reconciliation,” “dialogue,” and “disengagement” (Noor and 
Hayat, 2009). The inclusion of such a diverse constellation of terms probably services more to 
mar and cloud our understanding of the process, yet it might serve as a useful vantage point 
for formulating a rich cross-section of concepts, impressions, beliefs with which we might 
move forward. As noted by Noor and Hayat (2009), “the main reason for the use of different 
terms in different societies seems to be the realization of the socio-political activities attached 
European Scientific Journal   December 2013 /SPECIAL/ edition vol.2  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
129 
 
to each of them” (1). Whereas some are used in Asian societies, others are employed 
primarily in European, which vary considerably to those employed in the US. 
 
The Tide of Terror: Al‐Gama’a Al‐Islamiyya and Harakat Al-Muqawamah Al-
Islamiyyah: The Islamic Group 
Since the late-1970s Egypt’s largest militant group, that of GAI (also referred to as Al-
Gama’t, Egyptian Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Gama’at), was active as a loosely 
organized network, and was supported beyond the borders of the Egyptian state (US 
Department of State [DoS], 2006: 194). In fact, has been referred to more as a phenomenon 
rather than an organization that was “mainly affected by the militant ideology of Sayyid Qubt 
(executed in 1966), who paved the way for the establishment of several Islamic branches in 
Egypt and the Arab world” (ICT, 2013). When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat released a 
large number of Islamic prisoners from state jails and prisons, militant groups began 
organizing throughout Egypt and assumed such names as the “Islamic Liberation Party,” “Al-
Takfir wal Hijra” (Excommunication and Emigration), “Al-Najun min Al-nar” (Saved from 
the Inferno), and “Jihad” (Holy War) as well as “Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya” (ICT, 2013). 
“Each cell operated separately and was self-contained,” states the ICT (2013), “a fact that 
allowed the organization to be structured, but at the same time loosely organized.” 
In 1997, IG issued a ceasefire that resulted in the fragmentation of the group into two 
parts. The first was led by Mustafa Hamza (who supported the ceasefire put forward by the 
group) while the splinter group operated under the leadership of Rifa’I Taha Musa, who 
“called for a return to armed operations” against the state of Egypt and its internal as well as 
external supporters (US DoS, 2006: 194). After issuing a second ceasefire in March 1999, the 
spiritual leader of the group, Shaykh Umar Abd Al-Rahman, was detained by US authorities 
for his involvement in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and subsequently 
repealed his support for the group’s ceasefire in June 2000 (US DoS, 2006: 194). 
Targets of IG are divided into two groups based on specific periods. Prior to the 
group’s 1997 ceasefire, Egyptian security and government officials as well as Coptic 
Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism were the principle targets of IG. 
However, following the issuance of the ceasefire, the faction (under the leadership of Taha 
Musa) expanded the scope of violence waged by IG so as to include foreigners such as 
tourists within the country (i.e., the attack at Deir el- Bahri in Luxor). IG also was responsible 
for the attempted political assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while he was 
visiting Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (US DoS, 2006: 194). The 1997 Luxor massacre that led to the 
deaths of 58 tourists and four Egyptians was the last attack undertaken by IG, however, in 
Feburary 1998, one of the group’s senior members backed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa, which 
called for violent attacks against the US and American citizens throughout the world (US 
DoS, 2006: 194). In spite of seemingly misguided violence with attacks against Egyptian 
nationals and foreigners, the primary objective of IG and for the group’s members remained 
the overthrow of the Egyptian government and its replacement with an Islamic state (US DoS, 
2006: 194). 
On a structural level, IG’s close ties with AQ facilitated an exchange of 
communication that could be used to support the growth and operations of the organization in 
a number of ways. Its direct ties with strong terrorist networks meant that it was able easily 
launch attacks within Egypt at any time. IG considered the secular state of Egypt a threat to its 
perceptions of Islamic principles and used extreme interpretations of the religion in order to 
channel discontent and hatred toward agents that were pro-Western and pro-Christian, and 
that stood in strong opposition to the Islamization of Egypt and other states in the Middle 
East. In this vein, religion played one of the primary methods of bringing together peoples 
with or strengthening and honing their extreme political and social ideals and aspirations. A 
common factor in the radicalization of extremist groups across the globe, the Islamic religious 
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component supported efforts to achieve aims of IG through both violent and non-violent 
means, although a focus should be maintained on the radicalization of IG and its supporters 
using Islam as a medium into violent extremism. 
With the Egyptian government showing strong disinterest in waging aggressive action 
against Israel during the 1970s, IG began to view Egypt’s governing authority as a Zionist 
sympathizer, using this distorted image of Egypt’s Muslim leaders as a method of arousing 
anti-Semitic feelings in the group’s followers. In other words, “peace with Israel in 1979 
yielded a new sense of fundamentalist outrage” (ICT, 2014). From that point onward, Sadat 
increasingly aligned himself with US foreign policy. IG used the resultant outrage as a dual 
strategy to simultaneously incite hatred toward their Zionist enemy and toward the Egyptian 
government, which brought about what was referred to as a “shameful peace with the Jews” 
(Kepel, 2003: 149). Sadat, “in the minds of Islamists … personified domestic failure and 
external betrayal. He was seen to be neglecting his Arab neighbors in favor of closer ties with 
the West, paricularly Israel and the United States” (ICT, 2013). As opposition by the Egyptian 
government toward the group began to build, an incentive was further created to resist the 
government. By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, the number of followers of 
IG began to grow significantly.  
Domestically, a number of significant factors should be considered and taken into 
account forces equally potent as those at the structural level. The religious component enabled 
leaders to emphasize an alleged assault against the values of Islam and Islam itself so as to tap 
into both individual and group grievance and was being cultivated by other structural, 
domestic, and individuals elements at work. The resilience and lethality of the group played a 
considerable role in the ongoing radicalization of IG as well as the non-existence of other 
radical or extremist within the country. Its violent narrative through the 1990s consists of 
hundreds of law enforcement officers’ deaths, the killing of numerous soldiers, many civilians 
including foreign tourists as well as attempts against secular intellectuals, and Christian Copts 
(ICT, 2013). The group is even closely connected to the 1981 political assassination of 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. IG, according to Kepel (2003), is said to be the “Islamic 
movements only genuine mass organization” in the country (129).  
The struggle between the government and IG began to increase dramatically on 
university campuses through legislation in Cairo with the aim of weakening the influence of 
the group by reducing the group’s decision making powers on campuses and instead place 
more control in the hands of institution administrators. This was a moment when clashes 
between the opposing groups resulted in greater calls on the part of IG to reduce female 
enrollment, bring gender-mixed classes to an end, and halt a great number of social function 
and customs such as film activities, music concerts, dances. Their calls for extreme change in 
these forms were supplemented by a use of physical force against those who opposed it 
(Metz, 1990; Kepel, 2003: 149). 
The individual basis for understanding some of the causes of the group’s radicalization 
process is difficult to isolate given the crossover between all three categories. 
Notwithstanding this problem of delineation of factors and explanations, it is worth noting 
that the aftermath of the Muslim Brotherhood’s renouncement of violence in Egypt in the 
1970s left a large swathe of individuals seeking entry to Egyptian militant students groups. As 
previously mentioned, the group was primarily active during its early days at academic 
institutions and university campuses and sought to attract a student minority that may have 
felt threatened by the majority of leftists. With rapid expansion on campus, individual 
supporters of IG began to form the new majority. Thus, they found themselves in an ideal 
position from which to express their strong social and political beliefs. Accordingly, the 
associations were able to push for requirements regarding Islamic dress codes, the veiling of 
female students, and strong gender divisions amongst classes on campuses. Opposition to 
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their social aims at various university campuses fuelled their desire to apply fundamental 
Islamic principles to an even greater extent (Metz, 1990). 
Even before the 1990s, the group had become fully radicalized, employing violence to 
a great extent, and seemingly targeting individuals at random and targeting specific officials 
within the government. Perhaps the pinnacle of IG’s violent radicalism was demonstrated in 
1997 with the Luxor massacre. This event was a response to the apprehension and 
incarceration of Sheikh Omar Adbel-Rahman by US authorities for attempting to motivate 
Muslims around the world to violently engage with the US (US Department of Justice, 200). 
The call for Muslims to fight in the name of IG and in the name of Islam was one that spread 
quickly across communities of supporters of IG’s cause and well throughout the organization 
itself. Not only was it an attitude that helped strengthen the pitch of IG extremism and 
radicalization, it was also one of the perfect propaganda tools for the leadership of IG that was 
readily employable on both the domestic and individual levels. 
 
The Islamic Resistance Movement 
The Islamic dimension is characteristics of Hamas’ struggle on behalf of the 
Palestinian people although it has been influenced during the 1960s and 1970s by attitudes of 
the Palestinian fida’iyeen, the group strongly considers itself as a “natural extension of the 
Palestinian resistance – in its various manifestations – to the Zionist invasion” (Marzouq 
quoted in Hroub, 2000: 11; Hroub, 2000: 11). Founded in 1988 as a result of the first 
Palestinian Intifada, Hamas was quick to respond to the Israeli occupation that was taking 
place at the time by printing leaflets and advocating the use of violence means to confront the 
Israeli surge (Schiff and Ya’ari, 1989; Berman, 2003). The Israeli invasion was therefore a 
cardinal factor in radicalizing militants who were prepared to use excessive violence as an 
immediate response to the exogenous threat confronting them. From nearly the very 
beginning of its formation, Hamas underwent an ideological shift, “adopting a nationalist 
position more extreme than that of the [Palestinian Liberation Organization] PLO, making the 
immediate conquest of all of Palestine (as opposed to just the West Bank and Gaza) a 
religious obligation” (Berman, 2003: 9). 
Hamas is a product of the Muslim Brotherhood and views itself as one of the wings of 
the Muslim Brothers in Palestine (Hamas Charter, 1988). Although Hamas has a strong 
connection with “the broad current of general Palestinian resistance, the characteristics, make-
up, ideology, and political discourse of Hamas reflect its organization roots and its historic 
ties to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in particular” (Hroub, 2000: 11-12). Despite its 
position as a militant Islamic group in a mostly secular society strained by constant violent 
conflict, Hamas has been able to continuously appeal to and maintain the support many 
around it (Levitt, 2006). Violence is taken by Hamas as a political means, and experience has 
shown that the group’s continued use of violence in order to achieve many of its political 
objectives and to facilitate its existence has not precluded its continued and even growing 
support.  
The main expedients of Hamas’ radicalization and the continued radicalization of 
Palestinian youth share a wide range of similarities with IG. “The process of becoming an 
adherent of radical Islam is fundamentally a didactic process,” states Levitt (2007), “as is the 
indoctrination to any ideology – whether political, philosophical, or religious.” When 
individuals benefit from the support of Hamas, they in turn support the group that assisted 
them. As Hamas militants underwent a process of indoctrination, participated in the Hamas 
dawa, as agents and as subjects and “instructed in the language of radical Islam,” Palestinian 
youth are also currently schooled in the ideological tenets of Hamas in addition to being 
“supervised, mentored, cajoled, threatened, and praised” (Levitt, 2007). A striking similarity 
between IG’s rise to radicalism and Hamas’ radicalization processes is their use of 
educational institutions and campuses, public syndicates, health institutions, cultural 
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institutions, technical institutions, sports clubs, media, religious institutions, and women’s 
institutions, all of which serve as rich human resources for the groups. This deep reach into 
Palestinian society means that Hamas is able to maintain a productive recruitment process of 
young men and woman in the organization who are also able to “melt” into the regular 
communities through employment and “hide in plain view” (Levitt, 2006: 85-86). 
Even though Islam appears to play a central role in Hamas and its ideology, Islamic 
values vary from one member of Hamas to another and cannot necessarily be attributed to the 
group’s original process of radicalization (Goldberg, 2009). The “revanchist dream” (failures 
of national determination) and not religious fervor as a primary drive is at the heart of Hamas’ 
radicalization process. Unlike IG in Egypt, a group that was not predicated upon the concept 
of national determination, Hamas is in a constant struggle primarily to bring about the 
establishment of a Palestinian state (O’Sullivan, 2009). IG poised itself, not to establish a 
state fro nothing, but rather to reform the current state from one that is secular to one that is 
purely Islamic. As reasoned by O’Sullivan (2009), the conflict in the Palestinian territories 
and the rise of Hamas took place “in the setting of the British Empire” and were augmented as 
a result of “displacement generated by colonization, carried out by a vastly more powerful and 
ethnically distinct group of settlers” (12). In Palestine, ethnic and economic discrimination, 
political repression, and the occupation of ancient and historically significant lands by 
military forces melded so as to bear the radicalization of a large grouping of peoples, 
neighborhoods, and communities not necessarily connected in any way (O’Sullivan, 2009). 
Thus, “the injustice of ‘Al-Nakba,’ as the Palestinians call the loss of their country in 1948 … 
is inextricably bound to future militancy” (O’Sullivan, 2009: 18).  
 Hamas flourished as a result of a continued radicalization process in much the same 
way as did IG in Egypt. With greater achievement and success that led to an overall 
strengthening of the organization, support continued to find its way to Hamas. Their 
successful attacks, ability to offer and deliver on their promises of protection to select 
communities as well as offer support to those willing to back Hamas in other ways were 
seminal factors in the rise of this group over the years. The structural component of Hamas is 
the single most important factor in its success and its ability to maintain and strengthen its 
radicalization efforts over time. A blend of moderate and hardliner voices at the table has 
enabled the organization to make decisions that result in its longevity and serve the overall 
life expectancy of the group. This results in a series of positive “checks and balances within 
Hamas,” according to O’Sullivan (2009), that makes up Hamas’ flexible, adaptable, and 
inclusive structure even in spite of it being a highly ritualistic and extremely conservative 
Muslim group (Berman, 2003). 
 Both IG and Hamas have been able to show its supporters and even dissidents that 
their key objectives are achievable through violent means. It is through their ability to deliver 
to their supporters through violence that reinforces the notion that violence is thus necessary 
and readily available to achieve explicit goals. Even if the use of violence has spawned a call 
for action against the users of violence, through violence, the result has been positive for 
Hamas in its radicalization efforts. To some extent it can be claimed that the West’s responses 
to Hamas’ violent acts provide the very sustenance required for its continued existence. The 
existence of and radicalization of the Islamic Resistance Movement would not have been 
possible in the first place had it not been for political repression – the kind of repression that 
Israel and its Western allies have been eager to provide in spite of its obvious cultivation of an 
ever-evolving and ever-strengthening group. In turn, Hamas uses this repression to cast a 
narrative that serves its purpose of recruiting Palestinians, softening them to the indoctrination 
methods and arguments for adherence, and creating a mobilized social network that can 
strengthen itself (O’Sullivan, 2009).  
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Transformation of Violent Extremism? 
IG’s violence and influences in Egypt ebbed rather quickly as compared to its long and 
steady path to radicalization. The Egyptian government’s response to IG during the latter half 
of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium resulted in the seizure of handfuls of 
IG leaders. Their removal showed that IG relied heavily on its leadership to fortify the group 
and giving it the direction necessary for undertaking struggle. Egypt extremely punitive 
measures against IG leadership and members resonated strongly throughout Egyptian society 
while the indiscriminate killings of foreigners and tourists as well as political assassinations 
by the group led to a wave of resentment among the general Egyptian population. The group 
was successful in reducing its own profile through excessive use of violence but still manages 
to retain some prestige among Egyptian Islamists who still hope to see the emergence of a 
truly Islamic Egypt and the dissolution of Egyptian secularism. After 20 years of 
imprisonment, the Egyptian government released more than 900 members including its 
founder in groups over a period of a week (Al Jazeera, 2006).  
 IG leadership’s collective ideological reversal is seen as an exceptional instance 
among Islamic extremist groups. The group has forsaken violence and delivered public 
apologies for attacks that it made over the course of its struggle against the Egyptian state, 
and replaced its violent rhetoric and appeal with a new ideological standing based on the 
value of coexistence with Egypt (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). Renouncing violence as 
an instrument served as a strident move toward the delegitimization of terrorism as a tactic 
(Speckhard, 2011: 1). IG’s new ideology has also fuelled its efforts to advocate against AQ 
extremism and inhibit its influence on Muslims and Muslim communities. Even with this 
exceptional reversal of ideologically fuelled violence and aggression, mapping the changes 
and the collective shift away from its tradition has been a difficult task. Part of the task has 
involved the understanding of changes that has taken place in the group’s thought and the 
rationale from the leadership position. The removal of key leaders was probably one of the 
most decisive factors in the disarming IG that opened the long path to integration into 
Egyptian society. 
 On October 8, 1981, two days after the successful assassination of Sadat, members of 
IG launched an attack against the Security Administration in Asyut with the aim of seizing the 
city from government control (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). In the aftermath of the failed 
attempt, dozens of IG members has been slain, dozens of government officials were killed, 
and the leaders of IG were taken into custody. Devoid of leadership, a subsequent struggle for 
the identification of group authority took place. Some of the members recognized the detained 
leadership of IG in Egypt as the group’s authority while others recognized the power of 
Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). The ideological schism 
blossomed into the splitting of the group with GAI members moving away from followers of 
the Jihad organization. Initial discord was based on Jihad members’ disagreement with the 
assault that had taken place at Asyut and the ensuing massacre. Arguments were put forward 
that the Sheikh was not an appropriate individual to fill his position, and those who opposed 
him were made aware that he had been appointed Emir during their periods of incarceration. 
With no agreeable conclusion to be made between the two factions, IG officially divided in 
1983. 
 The 1990s save waves of violence across Egypt, however, when the conciliation 
initiative was announced on July 5, 1997, “Al-Gama’a announced a unilateral initiative of 
conciliation with the Egyptian regime (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). During a court 
hearing, an Al-Gama’a member read aloud a communiqué, signed by six of the organization’s 
leaders, that declared a halt to all armed operations within and outside Egypt, and a stop to 
incitement to commit attacks” (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). This initiative was 
delivered several months prior to the Luxor massacre, and “then-head of Al-Gama’a’s Shura 
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Council, Rifa’i Taha, a man who deeply opposed the conciliation initiative was sentenced to 
death in absentia in 1992” (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). 
 It took several years for the conciliation initiative to push forward and really gain 
momentum. AQ’s attacks against the US homeland in 2001 compelled the Egyptian 
government to publicize what had been referred to as IG’s “ideological revolution” (Feldner, 
Carmon, and Lev, 2006) The reason for the government’s swift exposure of the shift that had 
taken place within the IG is not completely clear. Some argue that the Egyptian government 
had been in fear of AQ sweeping the country with violence and even possibly reigniting the 
violence that IG had once demonstrated. Given Egyptian citizens’ involvement in 9/11 (i.e., 
Muhammad ‘Atta, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Abu Hafs, Saif Al-‘Adel, to name a few), concern 
surfaced over possible damage to Egypt’s international reputation in much the same was it 
had for Saudi Arabia given extensive Saudi nationals’ involvement in 9/11 (Feldner, Carmon, 
and Lev, 2006). As part of a unique rehabilitation and reeducation program, Egyptian 
authorities permitted meetings among the incarcerated IG leaders in Egyptian prisons in order 
to move the conciliation process along at a quicker rate (Feldner, Carmon, and Lev, 2006). 
 A surprising element emerged shortly after the conciliation initiative was allowed to 
move forward within the prison walls. IG leaders published several books that featured at 
multiple venues around Egypt and that were sold at the Cairo international book fair. These 
works entitled, “Concept Correction Series,” and were the publications of Hamdi Abd Al-
Rahman, “the first Al-Gama’a leader to be released after the announcement of the initiative 
[who] dealt with their publication with the approval of the Egyptian authorities” (Feldner, 
Carmon, and Lev, 2006). This step was followed by IG’s leadership removal of all the 
handbooks that facilitated the momentum of the movement and encouraged its violent ways to 
make way for those that have been used by the Muslim Brotherhood. IG leaders that were 
detained for long periods of time and headed the conciliation initiative stated outright that, “in 
the past their actions were misguided from the religious standpoint, and pointless from the 
practical standpoint, they refused to acknowledge that they were morally flawed” (Feldner, 
Carmon, and Lev, 2006).  
 
Conclusion 
The concept of radicalization is one that fit neatly within a paradigm of contestation. Second, 
understanding radicalization is just as much about formulating broader and deeper 
interpretations of the terms, “radical,” “radicalism,” and “radicalizing.” As noted earlier in 
this work, a number of IOs and agents in international affairs have yet to actually produce 
precise, if any, working definition of the term radicalization or any of its derivatives. The 
same can be said, and to even a greater extent, of the concept of deradicalization. In essence, 
the term holds different meanings and implications that remain ultimately dependent on the 
location of the deradicalization process and those involved. Third, a great deal of research is 
yet required to fully understand the effects of deradicalization programs in terms of the 
restoration of members of society who at one point in time became so devoted to violent 
extremism so as to engage in the discriminate and indiscriminate killing of men, women, and 
children, sometimes in what seem to be vain attempts, to achieve a desired political end. 
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